We study how the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE) influenced the behavior of Agency mortgage real estate investment trusts (REITs)-a set of institutions identified by the Financial Stability Oversight Council as posing systemic risk. We document that Agency mortgage REITs: [i] equity prices reacted to QE announcements and in a manner consistent with their business prospects; [ii] grew markedly during QE2 and receded during QE3 in relation to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity; and [iii] increased their leverage during QE3. Our findings are consistent with unconventional monetary policy actions crowding out private investment and "reaching for yield" behavior by financial institutions.
Introduction
Following the recent global financial crisis and into the Great Recession, the Federal Reserve reduced its overnight interest rate (effectively) to the zero lower bound and engaged in large-scale purchases of long-term U.S. Treasury and Federal Agency securities. From the start of 2008 through the end of 2017, the U.S. central banks' balance sheet grew from $0.9 trillion to $4.5 trillion, and is now principally comprised of longer-term U.S. Treasury notes and bonds ($2.5 trillion) and Federal Agency mortgage-backed securities ($1.8 trillion). 1 Recently, the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has started to raise the short-term policy rate and announced a balance sheet normalization plan that intends to slowly and predictably reduce the A number of recent empirical studies have demonstrated that the Federal Reserve's large-scale asset purchases, or "quantitative easing" (QE), lowered long-term interest rates as intended -both for U.S. Treasury securities and Agency MBS. 3 As a matter of economic theory, these policy-driven effects are believed to result from reduced term premiums and/or lower expected levels of future short-term interest rates. The term premium may fall as central bank large-scale asset purchases reduce the amount of long-term, low-risk bonds in private-sector portfolios -a mechanism generally referred to as the "portfolio balance channel" (e.g., Bernanke, 2010) . The announcement of asset purchases may also cause market participants to revise down their expectations about the future path of short-term interest rates -known as the "signaling channel" (e.g., Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014) . Central bank communication that interest rates will remain low for a considerable period of time likely amplify these effects.
Such monetary policy interventions can have important implications for financial institutions. For example, Chodorow-Reich (2014) finds that the initial round of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing (QE1) benefitted various types of institutions by increasing legacy asset values and raising their net worth. However, as U.S. monetary policy accommodation lingered, there was growing concern about the potential for financial stability risks to emerge. Bernanke (2013) notes that maintaining low interest rates for too long may create incentives for market participants to take on greater duration or credit risks, or to employ additional financial leverage, in an effort to "reach for yield." While such risk-taking behavior is seemingly an intended consequence of QE, some recent theoretical research points to it being potentially distorted by agency problems associated with delegated asset management (e.g., Rajan 2005; Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz, and Shin 2014; Acharya and Naqvi 2015; Morris and Shin 2016) . Specifically, very low interest rate environments may make asset managers more sensitive to a funds' performance relative to peers, inducing them to take-on more risk. Related empirical evidence is provided by Chodorow-Reich (2014) , DiMaggio and Kacperczyk (2014) , and Choi and Kronlund (2018), each of whom finds evidence of heightened risk-taking by different types of non-bank financial institutions since the Federal Reserve began QE. 4 This paper examines a set of financial institutions that grew markedly during the Federal Reserve's balance sheet expansion: Agency Mortgage REITs (Agency MREITs). During the first two rounds of quantitative easing (QE1 and QE2), Agency MREIT total assets grew from $79.2 billion to $363.5 billion (356 percent) before receding during QE3. As the moniker suggests, Agency MREITs hold mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by U.S. government agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) and finance them with a 3 combination of equity and short-term debt in the form of repurchase agreements (repo). Hence, they are engaged in significant maturity transformation (i.e., a "carry trade") that involves material interest rate and liquidity risks without access to government backstops. In fact, the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council (2013) raised the specter of financial stability concerns emanating from Agency MREITs. The Council's thesis is that these institutions are vulnerable to a sharp increase in interest rates that would erode the value of their assets. Given Agency MREITs' reliance on short-term collateralized borrowing, this could lead to dealer margin calls, increases in repo haircuts, and deleveraging. At worst, dealer funding could be markedly reduced, forcing significant asset sales and placing downward pressure on Agency MBS prices (or equivalently upward pressure on yields). The underlying assumption is that Agency MREITs act in unison in response to a shock given their homogenous business model. 5 To identify the effects of unconventional monetary policy on Agency MREIT growth and risk taking, we compare them with all other MREITs. These latter firms make a natural control group since they are subject to all of the same legal requirements, but typically hold a broader portfolio of mortgage-related debt. Thus we expect Non-Agency MREITs to be significantly less sensitive to the central banks' posture in the Agency MBS market than the more specialized Agency MREITs. Our empirical approach is similar to that in a recent study by Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2017) that examines responses to QE across U.S. commercial banks with differential exposure to the Agency MBS market.
We conduct three sets of analyses to better understand the behavior of Agency MREITs after the recent financial crisis and in the context of the Federal Reserve's QE. First, following Chodorow-Reich (2014), we conduct a high-frequency event study of the equity market reactions across Agency and Non-Agency MREITs to various central bank announcements. We find that Agency MREITs reacted to most announcements, did so in a manner consistent with their business prospects, and differently from Non-Agency MREITs, other financial institutions, as well as the broader market. Second, we study Agency MREIT asset growth and equity issuance and find that this was generally inversely associated with the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase 4 activity during QE2 and QE3. We regard this as novel evidence for the central bank directly crowding-out private investment as per the portfolio balance channel. Our third analysis focuses on the relationship between Agency MREIT risk-taking and QE. Here we find that, during QE3, Agency MREITs increased their leverage in relation to the Federal Reserve's purchase activity --consistent with "reaching for yield" by these institutions.
However, the interest rate risk profiles of these institutions became more conservative during the Tapering period, by holding more floating rate securities, lengthening liabilities, and increasing hedging.
Our analysis is most closely related to three recent papers. First, Chodorow-Reich (2014) conducts a high frequency event study of various QE announcements and the market reactions for a sample of commercial banks and life insurers (as well as the broader market). The author also provides some evidence that money market and pension funds increased their risk-taking during 2009 . Second, DiMaggio and Kacperczyk (2016 find that, when the Federal Reserve holds the policy rate at the effective zero lower bound, money market funds increased their risk as measured by: yield spreads, the fraction of bank-issued obligations held, asset concentration, and weighted-average maturity. Finally, Choi and Kronlund (2018) study corporate bond mutual funds and find that "reaching for yield" behavior is more pronounced when the level and slope of the term structure are low.
Our study contributes to the literature along at least two dimensions. First, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical analysis of Agency MREITs. 6 This is potentially very important given the prominent role that these shadow banks could play going forward in the $5.8 trillion Agency MBS market following the postconservatorship shrinkage of such holdings by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Federal Reserve's balance sheet normalization. Second, given that Agency MREITs do not take-on much credit risk, we are able to focus on whether these institutions altered instead their leverage, liquidity risk, and interest rate risk profiles during QE. This inquiry is in sharp contrast to the extant literature, which has focused exclusively on credit risk-taking by money market funds, pension funds, and corporate bond funds.
2 Mortgage REITs
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) are specialized investment vehicles that invest in real estate-related assets. REITs are exempt from specific provisions of the Investment Company Act, which implies that they are not subject to prudential regulation, including leverage limits. A REIT may be a public company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission or privately held. A public REIT may have its shares listed on an exchange, or be unlisted and have shares sold directly to investors by broker-dealers. As long as REITs distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable net income annually, they are exempt from federal corporate income tax. 7 To the extent that such distributions are in the form of dividends, these profits are taxed at the shareholder's ordinary income tax rate and hence avoid double-taxation. The high level of mandatory dividend distributions implies that REITs primarily fund growth by raising new equity, rather than through retained earnings.
REITs generally specialize in either owning real estate assets or providing debt financing for them. Equity REITs own properties and typically focus on specific geographies and/or sectors (e.g., apartment, retail, or office). By contrast, mortgage REITs invest in whole mortgage loans and/or mortgage-backed securities that are secured by residential and commercial properties. As shown in Figure 1 , based on the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds data, a large share of MREIT investment is in Agency MBS guaranteed by either Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. 8 While Agency MBS are viewed as having virtually no credit risk, these instruments 7 Other important limits placed on REITs include: [1] maintaining at least 75 percent of total assets in qualifying real estate assets and cash; [2] receiving at least 75 percent of income from some combination of rent from real property, interest from mortgages securing real property, gains from the sale of real property, and distributions from other REITs; [3] receiving at least 95 percent of its income from the aforementioned qualified real estate sources or from certain other passive sources; [4] deriving less than 30 percent of gross income from the sale or other disposition of stock or securities held for less than six months, and real property held for less than four years; and [5] issue transferrable shares held by at least 100 individuals with no five or fewer owning more than 50 percent during the last half of the taxable year. 8 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) that securitize "conforming" residential mortgages; and since the financial crisis the two institution have enjoyed "effective" federal backing of all obligations (e.g., Frame, Fuster, Tracy, and Vickery, 2015) . Ginnie Mae is a government agency within the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created exclusively to securitize government-insured mortgages. All three institutions provide blanket guarantees on their MBS in exchange for guarantee fees (insurance premiums) from mortgage originators. 6 are very long-term and subject to significant prepayment risk arising from both borrower refinancing due to changes in interest rates and routine housing turnover.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Using institution-level data from S&P Global (formerly SNL Financial), Figure 2 (Panel A) shows that MREIT investment in Agency MBS has been persistently concentrated in a subset of these institutions that specialize in managing such portfolios. These so-called Agency MREITs are typically identified as holding more than one-half of their total assets in Agency MBS on average over the life of the firm; with an actual portfolio share of about 90 percent. During the early-2000s, there were only three Agency MREITs of note (Annaly Capital Management, Anworth Mortgage Asset Corporation and Capstead Mortgage Corporation). However, following the onset of the financial crisis and the Great Recession, as many as 14 were in operation at a given point in time. MREIT financing of Agency MBS involves a mix of equity and short-term collateralized debt in the form of bilateral repurchase agreements, or repo, entered into with broker-dealers. 9 While MREITs face no regulatory leverage limits, repo haircuts place an effective limit. Further, this margin must be maintained throughout the life of the loan; a margin call will occur if the collateral value falls beyond a pre-specified amount.
MREITs typically hold some unencumbered assets (cash and securities) as a liquidity buffer to cover any margin calls. repo debt is very short-term (< 30 days). The capital structure of Non-Agency MREITs is very different. Their share of equity financing steadily declined prior to the financial crisis (from roughly 20 percent to 10 percent), before jumping markedly thereafter. Non-Agency MREITs rely on repo financing much less than their Agency counterparts.
[ Figure 3 about here.] Figure 4 presents quarterly data on MREIT Agency MBS holdings in terms of both dollar levels and market shares for Agency MREITs and Non-Agency MREITs, respectively. Here we see that Agency MREITs expanded dramatically after the onset of the financial crisis and increasingly became important Agency MBS investors. Between 2008:Q4 and 2012:Q3, Agency MREITs increased their holdings of Agency MBS from $76.2 to $337.6 billion; and thereby increased their share of this market by more than a factor of four, from 1.5% to 6.4%. These amounts and shares declined thereafter. The collective holdings of Non-Agency MREITs never rose above $50 billion, which corresponds to less than one percent of the Agency MBS market.
[ Figure 4 about here] Much of this increase in Agency MREIT market share was concurrent with the shrinkage of Agency MBS holdings by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which themselves had long been the largest investors in this market.
The Federal Reserve's unconventional monetary policy, which started in 2009, interjected the central bank into the Agency MBS market, where it quickly became the largest investor. Figure 5 Given that REITs must distribute at least 90 percent of their taxable net income annually to remain exempt from federal corporate income tax, any significant growth requires new equity issuance. Figure 6 presents equity issuance data for Agency MREITs (Panel A) and Non-Agency MREITs (Panel B). For Agency MREITs, much of the new equity issuance is clustered in the 2010-2012 period, which coincides with the asset growth presented above.
[ Figure 6 Policymakers were concerned about the vulnerability of these shadow banks to sharp increases in interest rates that would erode the value of their assets, potentially resulting in a run on their short-term liabilities and a largescale sell-off in the Agency MBS market. Despite these conjectures, a systematic empirical analysis of Agency MREIT growth and risk-taking in the context of the Federal Reserve's quantitative easing is absent from the literature. This issue may be of ongoing policy interest as the central bank exits the Agency MBS market under its "portfolio normalization plan." Moreover, the recent experience suggests that Agency MREITs could play a significant role in the Agency MBS market going forward given the post-conservatorship shrinkage of such holdings by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Event Study
We begin our empirical analysis by conducting a high-frequency event study of the equity market reactions by (Agency and Non-Agency) MREITs to the 14 QE announcements previously studied by Chodorow-Reich (2014) . This analysis has two goals. The first is to illustrate that market participants expected MREITs to be materially affected by the Federal Reserve's QE, and that MREIT equity prices reacted appropriately to the 9 information available as well as compared to other financial institutions and the broader market. The second goal is to document the similarities and differences in the reactions across Agency and Non-Agency MREITs, which we use as control group in our subsequent analysis of Agency MREIT growth and risk-taking.
Central bank asset purchases tend to reduce long-term interest rates and increase the value of fixed-income securities held by institutions. In principle, we expect this effect to benefit both types of MREITs. However, Agency MBS benefit less from declines in long-term interest rates because of negative convexity owing to higher expected fixed-rate mortgage prepayments in a lower interest rate environment. Moreover, the Federal Reserve's purchase activity in the Agency MBS market directly alters investment opportunities for Agency MREITs --a strong form of the QE "portfolio balance channel." Thus, we expect both types of MREITs to be sensitive to QE-related announcements but we expect that Agency MREITs react differently from Non-Agency MREITs, which have more diverse portfolios.
Following Chodorow-Reich (2014), we obtain high-frequency, tick-by-tick equity price data from TAQ to construct 5-minute average trading prices from 7 to 2 minutes before the monetary policy announcements to 18 to 23 minutes after. The rationale behind the high-frequency event study is to identify a causal relationship between monetary policy surprises and equity market movements in a manner that trades off the need for a narrow enough window such that other aggregate shocks are not influencing asset prices, but one long enough such that the market can plausibly digest the new information. Table 1 presents our results for both types of MREITs and also reproduces results for life insurance companies, commercial banks, and the broader market from Chodorow-Reich (2014, Table 2 ). As expected, both types of MREITs reacted to most of the identified QE announcements; and there were significant differences in the reactions across Agency and Non-Agency MREITs. During QE1 and QE2, Agency MREITs generally reacted positively and in-line with the broader market, although the reaction was muted relative to Non-Agency MREITs, life insurers, and banks. This is consistent with QE increasing legacy asset values, but with fixed-rate Agency MBS capturing less than the full benefit due to negative convexity. The two forward guidance announcements that occurred during QE2 were perceived much more positively for Agency MREITs than for other financial institutions. This is likely due to a perception that the cost of their short-term repo liabilities would remain low for a considerable period of time. Agency MREITs reacted more strongly (in absolute terms) than Non-Agency MREITs and other financial institutions to the QE3 announcements. The announcements in May and June of 2013 were related to the so-called 'Taper Tantrum' and were quite negative for Agency MREITs as they would have unanchored expectations about their funding costs which had previously been tied-down by the forward guidance. However, this reversed with the September Federal Open Market Committee statement indicating that the economy was too soft to initiate tapering.
[ Table 1 about here.] This event study serves as the background to our main empirical analysis to follow. The results suggest that: (i) market participants clearly expected MREITs to be affected by the unconventional monetary policy measures; and (ii) that there are sufficient similarities but also important differences in the equity market reactions across Agency and Non-Agency MREITs to these announcements. We conclude from this analysis that there is some causal impact from the Federal Reserve's QE on MREITs, and that Non-Agency MREITs provide a suitable control group for our analysis of Agency MREITs.
Data and Sample Selection
Our main analysis focuses on MREIT growth and risk-taking during the Federal Reserve's QE. The primary data used for this analysis comes from S&P Global (formerly SNL Financial) and includes detailed quarterly information about REIT balance sheets, income statements, and capital market activities. SNL lists 60 MREITs operating over the period 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q4.
For each MREIT, we collect the following quarterly balance sheet information: Total Assets, Total Agency MBS, Total Repo Debt (with sub-categories reflecting different maturities), and Total Equity. We further obtain quarterly information about whether an MREIT issued equity or repurchased shares in a particular quarter, and the amount issued or number of shares repurchased. Finally, we hand-collect data on the type of Agency MBS holdings (fixed-rate versus variable rate) and derivative positions from MREIT 10-K and 10-Q reports. As these are not required reporting items, this information is only available for a sub-set of institutions. To distinguish Agency MREITs, we first calculate the ratio of Agency MBS to total assets for each firm-quarter 2005:Q1 through 2015:Q4 and flag the institutions for which this ratio on average exceeds 50 percent. 10 We also collect data for three interest rate variables which comprise the principal drivers of the profitability of Agency MBS investment. The 3-month and 10-year Treasury constant maturity rates come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis from which we construct measures of the level (3-month CMT) and slope of the U.S. Treasury yield curve (10-year CMT less 3-month CMT). The option-adjusted mortgage spread (OAS) is important as a measure of the "attractiveness" of Agency MBS investment versus holding long-term Treasury bonds. 11 We use Bloomberg Barclay's US MBS Fixed Rate Average OAS as a proxy. 12 We also collect two series that are primarily related to credit-sensitive mortgage investments held by Non-Agency MREITs. The first is the quarterly growth rate in the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index and the second is the quarterly spread between Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond yield and the yield on the 10-Year CMT.
We are interested in learning about changes in the behavior of Agency MREITs during the late-2000s, and the extent to which their behavior responded to changes in the monetary policy environment. To this end, Table 2 [ Table 2 about here.]
To supplement the information about the QE regimes, we obtain quarterly data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York about the central banks' purchases and holdings of Agency MBS, as well as the total amount of these securities issued and outstanding per quarter. firm-quarters include equity issues, with the average amount issued per quarter being 1.1 percent of the total book value of assets at the beginning of the quarter. For Non-Agency MREITs, these numbers were 14 percent and 1.7 percent respectively. The average equity-to-assets ratio is also quite different between the two types of MREITs: 14 percent for Agency MREITs and 29 percent for Non-Agency MREITs over the study period.
For Agency MREITs, the average ratio of total repo debt to total assets is 78 percent; with the average share of short-term repo debt (due within 30 days) being 47 percent. Non-Agency MREITs also utilize repo debt, although their average share is 16 percent. Non-Agency MREITs also maintain higher cash buffers, on average.
As noted above, we have data on the types of Agency MBS held (fixed-rate versus variable rate) and use of interest rate swaps and swaptions for a subset of MREITs. We were able to obtain information on the type of Agency MBS held for 26 firms and data on derivative usage for 25 firms. Agency MREITs tend to hold mostly fixed-rate Agency MBS (58 percent), although there is very wide dispersion (0 to 100 percent of total Agency MBS holdings). By contrast, Non-Agency MREITs predominantly invest in variable rate Agency MBS (as the fixed-rate share is only nine percent). For Agency MREITs, the average share of swaps to total liabilities was 47 percent; adding in swaptions increases this figure to 48 percent. Non-Agency MREITs use interest rate derivatives much less intensively as the ratio of swaps to total liabilities was 14 percent -a figure invariant to the inclusion of swaptions. For both types of MREITs, there is significant cross-sectional variation in the use of interest rate derivatives.
The average 3-month constant maturity Treasury rate for our firm-quarter sample was just over one percent, but ranged from 0.01 to 5.08 percent. In terms of other variables capturing the interest rate environment, the slope of the term structure averaged two percent and the option-adjusted mortgage spread averaged 0.49 percent. The Federal Reserve's quarterly average share of Agency MBS purchases to newly issued securities was 25 percent, but ranged from zero to 86 percent.
[ Table 3 about here.]
QE and Agency MREIT Growth
To identify the effects of unconventional monetary policy on Agency MREIT asset growth we compare them with all other MREITs. As noted above, these latter firms make a natural control group since they are subject to all of the same legal requirements, but typically hold a broader portfolio of mortgage-related debt.
Our approach is consistent with that taken by Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2017), who examine differences in commercial bank responses to quantitative easing by comparing institutions with high Agency MBS holding shares to those with low ones.
Empirical Approach
We begin our regression analysis by seeking to understand the drivers of Agency MREIT growth, defined as the quarterly percentage change in the book value of assets, relative to non-Agency MREITs. To identify this effect, we include a dummy variable indicating if the firm is an Agency MREIT. 14 The profitability of Agency MBS investment is predicated on the level and slope of the term structure and the relative attractiveness of Agency MBS versus Treasury bonds. To capture this, we include three variables.
First, we have the 3-month constant maturity Treasury rate (3-Month CMT). The second is the slope of the term structure of U.S. Treasury rates (Term Structure) defined as the difference between the 10-year and 3month constant maturity rates. We also include the option-adjusted mortgage spread (Option Adjusted Spread).
Finally, we control for variation in house price growth (Case-Shiller Index) and credit risk premiums (Credit Spread).
Next, we consider a set of relevant firm characteristics. Given that REITs must distribute a large fraction of their earnings as dividends, asset growth must largely be financed through new equity issuance. We examine this by including the amount of equity issued as a percentage of total assets at the end of the previous quarter (Amount of Equity Issued). Conversely, since REITs may also contract, we include the number of shares repurchased as a percentage of total shares outstanding at the end of the previous quarter (Number of Shares Repurchased). Our regressions also control for MREIT size, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets, which is lagged one quarter. We next examine equity issuance, given its important role in supporting MREIT growth. Equation (2) shows the regression for equity issuance (an indicator for Issued Equity) in the same general framework, using interest rate variables, firm characteristics, and monetary policy variables as predictors, and separately augmenting the model by interacting the Agency MREIT indicator with the Federal Reserve Agency MBS purchase share variable.
(2) Equity Issuanceit = f(Agency MREITi, Interest Rate Variablest, L.Firm Characteristicsit, Monetary Policy Variablest) + εit Here the relevant firm characteristics are size (as defined previously) and the lagged value of the MREITs' market-to-book ratio of equity, which captures market timing considerations that drive equity issuance decisions (Baker and Wurgler, 2000) . All regressions are estimated via OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. Table 4 presents the results of our asset growth regressions. Not surprisingly, MREIT growth is strongly positively associated with the amount of equity issued and negatively related to share repurchases. This reflects the strict pay-out requirements for REITs and the resulting reliance on external funding to finance any material growth. We also find that Agency MREITs grew more during our sample period than Non-Agency MREITs --especially during QE2 when the Federal Reserve halted its Agency MBS purchases. However, Agency MREIT growth was negatively related to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchases relative to new issuance during QE3 and the Tapering period. This is consistent with Agency MREITs facing reduced investment opportunities as the central bank re-entered the Agency MBS market.
Results
[ Table 4 about here.] Given the important role of equity issuance for Agency MREIT growth, we examine this directly in Table   5 . In each case, lagged market-to-book ratios are positive and statistically significant -consistent with market timing considerations. We also see that Agency MREITs, on average, were more likely to issue equity than other MREITs over the entire sample. However, the Federal Reserve's QE program had very different implications for each type of MREIT. Agency MREITs issued significantly more equity than Non-Agency MREITs during QE2. However, during QE3 and the Tapering, equity issuance significantly increased for Non-Agency MREITs and decreased for Agency MREITs. These results are again consistent with the central bank crowding-out private investment in Agency MBS as per the portfolio balance channel of monetary policy.
[ Table 5 about here.]
QE and Agency MREIT Risk Taking
To identify the effects of unconventional monetary policy on Agency MREIT risk-taking, we again rely on the cross-sectional comparison to all other MREITs as a control group, consistent with the approach in Chakraborty, Goldstein and MacKinlay (2017).
Empirical Approach
We explore various MREIT risk measures in a similar framework as asset growth and equity issuance: (i) the ratio of equity to total assets (solvency risk); (ii) the ratio of repurchase agreements to total assets, and very short-term repo (< 30 days) as a share of total repo debt (liquidity risk); and (iii) the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (liquidity risk). Equation (3) Finally, for a sub-set of MREITs, we examine variation in two measures of interest rate risk exposure: (i) the ratio of fixed-rate Agency MBS to total Agency MBS; and (ii) the ratio of interest rate swaps and swaptions to total liabilities. Equation (4) summarizes these relationships, where the dependent variables are related to the same set of interest rate and monetary policy variables, as well as three lagged firm characteristics: the ratios of equity to total assets, short-term repo to total repo, and cash to total assets. As before, we estimate the model via OLS with standard errors clustered by firm. In all of these regressions, interactions between the Federal Reserve Agency MBS purchase shares and the Agency MREIT indicator are added separately, as before.
Results
In Table 6 , we find that MREIT equity-to-assets ratios are consistently positively related to cash holdings and negatively related to the option-adjusted spread and firm size. We also see that Agency MREITs have significantly lower equity-to-assets ratios overall. MREITs collectively experienced a decline in their equity-toassets (i.e., increased leverage) in relation to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity during QE1.
Agency MREITs experienced further declines during QE3 in proportion to Federal Reserve Agency MBS purchase activity; a time in which Non-Agency MREITs were increasing capital buffers. This suggests reaching for yield by Agency MREITs in the face of unconventional monetary policy through increased leverage.
[ Table 6 about here.] Table 7 explores variation in MREIT use of repurchase agreements for financing and see that this is negatively related to their cash holdings. Not surprisingly, we also find that Agency MREITs finance themselves much more intensively using repurchase agreements. However, we find little relationship between QE and MREIT repo financing activity, with the exception of the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase share during the Tapering period.
[ Table 7 about here.] Table 8 studies the composition of repo financing by exploring variation in the ratio of very short-term repo (<30 days) to total repo. Here, we again see a positive relationship with the Agency MREIT indicator consistent with their business model. Agency MREITs then shortened the maturity of their repurchase agreements in response to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchases during QE1. Finally, during QE3, while Non-Agency MREITs increased their use of very short-term repurchase agreements in response to the Federal Reserve's purchase activity, Agency MREITs decreased their usage.
[ Table 8 about here.] Finally, in Table 9 , we see that MREIT's ratios of cash to total assets are positively related to their equityto-assets ratios -consistent with the relationship found in Table 6 . In terms of QE, Non-Agency MREITs hold significantly less cash in response to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchases during the Tapering period, although Agency MREITs did not (i.e., the net effect is statistically zero).
[ Table 9 about here.]
Turning to interest rate risk exposure, Table 10 presents the results of regressions considering variation in MREIT shares of fixed-rate Agency MBS holdings. Here we find that Agency MREITs consistently hold more fixed-rate securities than their Non-Agency counterparts. Moreover, the share of fixed-rate securities to total assets increases for all MREITs during QE3 and, to some extent, the Tapering period.
[ Table 10 about here.]
Finally, Table 11 studies the intensity of interest rate hedging by MREITs as proxied by the ratio of interest rate swaps and swaptions to total liabilities. (Agency MBS investment often involves significant maturity transformation through repo debt financing, which is then hedged using interest rate derivatives.) Here we find that Agency MREITs typically hedge their liabilities more intensively. In Column (2) we see that hedging by Non-Agency MREITs decreased in proportion to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase share, but that the reverse was true of Agency MREITs. This result is primarily driven by central bank activity during the Tapering period.
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[ Table 11 about here.] Taken together, our results suggest that the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity had important effects on Agency MREIT growth and risk-taking. In terms of growth, we document that Agency MREITs grew markedly during QE2 and subsequently receded during QE3 in relation to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity. This is consistent with the Federal Reserve's activity in the Agency MBS market crowding-out private-sector investment. In terms of risk-taking, we present evidence that Agency MREITs significantly increased their total leverage in response to the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity during QE3, consistent with greater risk-taking by these institutions at a time when their organic growth prospects were reduced. However, during QE3 and the Tapering, these institutions seemed to engage in assetliability management consistent with the policy environment by holding more floating rate securities, lengthening liabilities, and increasing hedging.
Conclusions
The prolonged use of unconventional monetary policy since the financial crisis resulted in concerns about the potential for such policy accommodation to undermine financial stability. Indeed, some recent research finds evidence consistent with "reaching for yield" behavior by financial institutions during this time via increased credit risk-taking. This paper contributes to that literature by studying Agency MREITs, a group of specialized, tax-exempt financial institutions whose rapid growth raised systemic risk concerns by the Financial Stability Oversight Council. We believe that this analysis is important for at least two reasons. First, this is the first empirical analysis of Agency MREITs; these shadow banks could play a central role in the $5.8 trillion Agency MBS market given the government-induced shrinkage of such holdings by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Federal Reserve's balance sheet normalization. Second, given that Agency MREITs do not takeon much credit risk, we are able to focus on whether these institutions altered instead their leverage, liquidity risk, and interest rate risk profiles during QE.
We conducted three sets of analyses to better understand the behavior of Agency MREITs after the recent financial crisis and in the context of the Federal Reserve's QE. The first was a high-frequency event study of 20 the equity market reactions across Agency and Non-Agency MREITs to various central bank announcements.
Here we found that Agency MREITs reacted to most announcements, did so in a manner consistent with their business prospects, and reacted differently from Non-Agency MREITs, other financial institutions, as well as the broader market. Second, we studied Agency MREIT asset growth and equity issuance and find that this was generally inversely associated with the Federal Reserve's Agency MBS purchase activity during QE2 and QE3. We regard this as novel evidence for the central bank directly crowding-out private investment as per the portfolio balance channel. Our third analysis focuses on the relationship between Agency MREIT risktaking and QE. Here we find that, during QE3, Agency MREITs increased their leverage in relation to the Federal Reserve's purchase activity --consistent with "reaching for yield" by these institutions. However, the interest rate risk profiles of these institutions became more conservative during the Tapering period, by holding more floating rate securities, lengthening liabilities, and increasing hedging. 
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Policy Normalization Principles
June 22, 2011 ---------
Maturity Extension Program (MEP) & Forward Guidance
MEP: September 2011 -December 2012
August 9, 2011 ---------Rates likely to remain at the effective lower bound at least until mid-2013. No additional purchases of Agency MBS and long-term Treasuries; maintain balance sheet size through reinvestment (as previous).
Rate Hike
December 2015 ------------Source: Federal Open Market Committee The table presents the panel regression results for Agency MREIT investment in fixed-rate agency MBS (measured as the ratio of fixed-rate agency securities to total agency securities), as a function of macroeconomic factors (level and slope of the term structure, option-adjusted mortgage spread, credit spread, growth in the Case-Shiller House Price index), firm and capital structure characteristics, as well as Federal Reserve purchase shares of Treasury Securities and Agency MBS. The study period is 2005-2015. All estimates are produced using OLS. Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are reported in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
(1) The table presents the panel regression results for Agency MREIT interest rate derivatives (measured as swaps and swaptions to total repo debt ratio), as a function of macroeconomic factors (level and slope of the term structure, option-adjusted mortgage spread, credit spread, growth in the Case-Shiller House Price index), firm and capital structure characteristics, as well as Federal Reserve purchase shares of Treasury Securities and Agency MBS. The study period is 2005-2015. All estimates are produced using OLS. Robust standard errors (clustered by firm) are reported in parentheses. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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